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Abstract
In this article we propose a mode of analysis that allows us to consider security as a
form distinct from insecurity, in order to capture the heterogeneity of security objects,
logics and forms of action. We first develop a genealogy for the anthropology of secur-
ity, demarcating four main approaches: violence and state terror; military, militarization,
and militarism; para-state securitization; and what we submit as ‘security assemblages.’
Security assemblages move away from focusing on security formations per se, and how
much violence or insecurity they yield, to identifying and studying security forms of
action, whether or not they are part of the nation-state. As an approach to anthropo-
logical inquiry and theory, it is oriented toward capturing how these forms of action
work and what types of security they produce. We illustrate security assemblages
through our fieldwork on counterterrorism in the domains of law enforcement, bio-
medical research and federal-state counter-extremism, in each case arriving at a diag-
nosis of the form of action. The set of distinctions that we propose is intended as an aid
to studying empirical situations, particularly of security, and, on another level, as a
proposal for an approach to anthropology today. We do not expect that the distinctions
that aid us will suffice in every circumstance. Rather, we submit that this work presents
a set of specific insights about contemporary US security, and an example of a new
approach to anthropological problems.
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In our study of US counterterrorism programs, we found that we needed a mode of
analysis that would allow us to consider security as a form distinct from insecurity,
in order to capture the heterogeneity of security objects, logics and forms of action.
This article ﬁrst presents a genealogy for the anthropology of security, demarcating
four main approaches: violence and state terror; military, militarization, and mili-
tarism; para-state securitization; and what we submit as ‘security assemblages.’
Security assemblages allow one to move away from focusing on security formations
per se, and how much violence or insecurity they yield, to identifying and studying
security forms of action, in all their heterogeneity and whether or not they are part
of the nation-state. As an approach to anthropological inquiry and theory, it is
oriented toward capturing how these forms of action work and what types of
security they produce. We illustrate security assemblages through our ﬁeldwork
on counterterrorism in the domains of law enforcement, biomedical research and
federal-state counter-extremism, in each case arriving at a diagnosis of the form of
action. The set of distinctions that we propose is intended as an aid to studying
empirical situations, particularly of security, and, on another level, as a proposal
for an approach to anthropology today. We do not expect that the distinctions that
aid us will suﬃce in every circumstance. Rather, we submit that this work presents
a set of speciﬁc insights about contemporary US security, and an example of a new
approach to anthropological problems.
In the winter of 2012, William Law, a staﬀ member of the National Science
Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), phoned to share information and
insights.1 During the conversation, he relayed the latest biosecurity concerns of
the board and of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), which oversees the
NSAAB, and discussed their eﬀort to establish a policy regarding Dual Use
Research of Concern (DURC). Most immediately, they wanted to address gain-
of-function studies of the H5N1 avian inﬂuenza virus, which deal with increased
transmissibility or virulence. Two groups of scientists had undertaken controversial
research that made the virus more readily transmissible, as a means of understand-
ing such an event should it occur without human intervention. They now wanted to
publish, putting their methods for altering the virus into the public domain and
thereby raising questions of biosecurity.
On the other side of the country that same winter, in a face-to-face interview, the
head analyst of an intelligence fusion center described a range of suspicious behav-
iors his team monitored, what they could signify, and how information about them
was shared. The unusual purchase of chemical supplies, reported by a vigilant
beauty store clerk, may be a ‘precursor to terrorist activity,’ he explained,
while declarations of violent intent made online, or to friends or family, can indi-
cate someone at risk of being recruited to violent extremism. Many in the
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US government had been working over the previous decade to develop counter-
terrorism initiatives to target and manage such behaviors. The initiatives intersect
at the fusion center, the analyst said, but more often than not the ﬁrst line of
contact is a local police oﬃcer.
Before 9/11, however, few among American police or biological researchers
considered terrorism to be their problem. Biosecurity concerns were historically
tied to four domains: infectious diseases, cutting-edge life sciences, laboratory
safety, and food safety (Collier and Lakoﬀ, 2008; Masco, 2014). But when letters
carrying military-grade anthrax began appearing around the country only one
week after 9/11, attention turned to how particular developments in the life sciences
might contribute to the terrorist threat. Likewise, although police departments in
the late 1990s reported concern about anti-government groups, anti-abortion activ-
ists, and what they labeled animal rights and environmental extremists, any act that
counted as terrorism fell under federal jurisdiction. Among the details of the 9/11
hijackers’ apparently ordinary American lives, however, were their routine encoun-
ters with state and local police oﬃcers. Plans were swiftly set in motion to integrate
what seemed like a potential wealth of intelligence into counterterrorism eﬀorts
(Stalcup, 2015a).
Security in that opening decade of the millennium was not new, nor was it quite
a matter of convergence, or of health and policing becoming securitized. Rather,
these cases highlight actual permutations of the relationships between what have
been, in many ways, co-constituted technologies of governance (Foucault, 2007
[2004]). In this article we pose a set of questions about this situation and consider
how anthropology does and could study security. What are the main theoretical
approaches? What is the ethical premise of each? How can security and insecurity
be distinguished, empirically and conceptually? In answering these questions, we
propose a mode of analysis that aims to capture the heterogeneity of security
objects, logics, and forms of action in diverse ﬁelds. ‘Security assemblages’ is a
move to expand anthropology’s existing focus on security formations, and on how
much violence and insecurity they yield, by distinguishing security forms of action.
In this, we remain dedicated to the anthropological ethos of attention to diversity
and distinctions found in ﬁeldwork.
We ﬁrst undertake a genealogy, and deﬁne four main approaches to security
within the anthropological literature: violence and state terror; the military, mili-
tarization, and militarism; para-state securitization; and what we submit here as
security assemblages. We extract these approaches in an ‘after the fact’ process, a
secondary reading through which we distinguish between them epistemologically
(although they do not necessarily emerge as such ontologically). We categorize
anthropological work according to these four topical clusters not because they
are linear or evolutionary, but because each takes from the possible ﬁeld of security
a diﬀerentially deﬁned object, develops it conceptually, and works within a certain
anthropological ethos.
Secondly, we demonstrate a security assemblages approach in our ﬁeldwork
on US counterterrorism in the domains of policing, biomedical research, and
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federal-local counter-extremism. Though all of these domains have come to be
broadly conceived of as part of US national security, each has its own distinctive
forms of security action. We thus shift from the spectrum of existing studies to
reﬂect on the more general problem of the anthropology of security and argue that
most research eventually deals with ‘insecurity’ as it emerges through diﬀerent
mechanisms (whether state terror, militarization, or the workings of neoliberalism).
Rather than making security solely an object (e.g. an institution) and conceptualiz-
ing its production of insecurity, we suggest treating it conceptually, that is, describ-
ing and analyzing empirical ways that security works (the forms of security action),
without subordinating them to a prescribed outcome. We present security assem-
blages as an analytical framework, drawing on Deleuze’s concept of the assemblage
and distinguishing it from apparatuses.2 Our proposal for security assemblages
draws on the Foucauldian governmentality apparatus for its methodological
insights, and transfers these to a proposal for a conceptual approach to theory
and inquiry in anthropology.
From an anthropology of insecurity to an anthropology
of security
In order to organize the distinct approaches to security in anthropology and pre-
sent their main diﬀerences, we provide the following chart (Figure 1). It presents
each group according to theoretical categories: objects, concepts, security forms of
action, critique, anthropological ethos, and analytical limit.3
Violence and state terror
An important set of studies made violence and insecurity objects of study and
critique. Earlier ‘anthropology of conﬂict’ debates had considered the social
value of conﬂict (e.g. LeVine, 1961), questioning whether conﬂict between sub-
groups serves to produce broad social cohesion (Gluckman, 1955; Turner, 1972)
or to disrupt it (Beals and Siegel, 1966). David Riches (1986) subsequently pro-
posed an ‘anthropology of violence,’ in which violence is a social and cultural
resource that can be practical and instrumental or symbolic and expressive.
In the mid- to late 1980s, scholarship continued this move from functionalism to
a more ‘critical’ perspective, examining how violence is experienced in everyday life
and constructed by social and historical conditions. The discipline’s gaze turned to
the causes, circumstances, and lived experience of various forms of violence, social
suﬀering, and state terror. In her groundbreaking Death without Weeping, Nancy
Scheper-Hughes (1992) describes ‘everyday violence’ as a chronic state of insecur-
ity. Examining state terror and military violence in Guatemala, Linda Green
‘capture[s] a sense of the insecurity that permeates individual women’s lives
wracked by worries of physical and emotional survival, of grotesque memories,
of ongoing militarization, of chronic fear’ (1994: 227–8). Around the same time,
Philippe Bourgois (1996) presents a critical view of the way anthropology has
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engaged ‘everyday violence’ with his work on ‘inner-city apartheid.’ He argues that
anthropology has been biased toward ﬁeldwork with ‘exotic others’ and shifts the
gaze of his scholarship to violence and insecurity ‘at home.’
‘Structural violence,’ elaborated by both Bourgois (2001) and Paul
Farmer (2003), also points to the social construction of insecurity. Drawing on
the concept of structural violence coined by Johan Galtung (1969), Farmer argues
in Pathologies of Power that extreme poverty in Haiti results from political and
economic forces deeply embedded in the country’s history. Poverty thus reﬂects
social and economic inequalities that determine who is at risk and who is shielded
(Farmer, 2003: 17–18).
Similarly concerned with victims and victimhood, Arthur Kleinman, Veena Das,
and Margaret Lock (1997) present the term ‘social suﬀering’ to bring diverse ﬁelds
of research, including health, welfare, law, morality, and religion, together into a
shared theoretical framework that emphasizes how political, economic, and instru-
mental forms of power create violence and suﬀering. These studies stress the social
aspects of suﬀering and the connection between violence and subjectivity (Das at
el., 2000; Garcia, 2010; Throop, 2010),4 as well as pain and the bodily experience of
violence (Das, 1995; Jenkins, 1998; Scarry, 1985).
A common tenet of these approaches is that state security is achieved through
state violence or terror. Michael Taussig (1984), among others who have written on
state violence in Latin America, invokes security as a totalizing power. States, would-
be states, and de facto government by corporations create a ‘culture of terror–space
of death’ as a way ‘to control massive populations through the cultural elaboration
of fear’ (Taussig, 1984: 469). One becomes socialized to this terror, the institution-
alization of which, alongside the brutal acts of the military, leads to a militarization
of everyday life and chronic societal fear (Green, 1994: 227).
Begon˜a Aretxaga notes that scholars began to suggest a ‘radical weakening and
transformation, if not disappearance, of the modern state’ as a result of globaliza-
tion, but she counters that ‘despite transformations in the character of the state in
an age of globalization, news of its demise is certainly exaggerated’ (2003: 394).
Although non-state actors, such as guerrillas, are crucial perpetrators of violence,
violence and terror wrought by the state remain central.
Non-state violence, such as intra-state, ethnic violence, however, ﬁgures prom-
inently in much anthropological work (Brass, 1997; Das, 1990; Tambiah, 1997;
Warren, 1993). Jeﬀrey Sluka argues that state terror speciﬁcally ‘refers to the
use or threat of violence by the state or its agents or supporters, particularly
against civilian individuals and populations,’ as ‘a means of repression’ and control
(2000a: 2; see also Sluka, 2000b). In ﬁeldwork in Belfast during the early 1980s and
1990s, he studied death squads and state support for armed groups that inﬂicted
terror on the civilian population. For Sluka, the line between state and non-state
terror becomes blurred, since the state supports and condones violence by
non-state actors. These together produce a culture of terror.
This group of studies takes violence and insecurity as objects of research.
The various ﬁelds of study are brought together conceptually as ‘violence in
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everyday life,’ ‘social suﬀering,’ and cultures of terror, to present and to document
the condition of victims and victimhood. Hence, a particular anthropological ethos
is provided, one that gives voice to the muted insecurity of the victims of violence,
through witnessing and representing their suﬀering. The analytic limit of this
approach is that insecurity rather than security is the object of study, and thus it
does not analyze how security or state security forms of action work.
Military, militarization, militarism
This body of work posits that anthropologists must study not only victims of vio-
lence but also perpetrators to understand what constitutes violence and insecurity
(Ben-Ari and Fru¨hstu¨ck, 2003: 540). Case studies have shifted observation and focus
onto military units. Donna Winslow (1997), for example, researches Canadian air-
borne peacekeepers in Somalia and their engagement in violence against the local
population. She argues that military culture and its strong emphasis on ‘group soli-
darity and cohesion’ (1997: 262) largely explain the violence. In the same vein, Eyal
Ben-Ari and Efrat Elron (2001) examine international peacekeeping units that per-
petrate violence, arguing that this behavior reﬂects a tension between national and
transnational belonging. John Hawkins (2001) shows intense contradictions between
the cultural values of American life and the cultural values necessary to survive in
combat among US military units in Germany during the Cold War. An organiza-
tional perspective brings other insights. For example, Edna Lomsky-Feder and Eyal
Ben-Ari (1999) examine civil-military hybrids and how new organizational structures
and processes emerge even as older, conventional patterns persist. These studies take
the military as their premier object of research; however, in their approach they again
refer to eﬀects of violence and insecurity.
Militarization has been another central concept in this scholarship. In her pion-
eering work Homefront, Catherine Lutz (2002a) studies the city of Fayetteville,
North Carolina, home to the Army’s Fort Bragg. Militarization, she explains in
Michael Geyer’s words, is ‘the contradictory and tense social process in which civil
society organizes itself for the production of violence’ (Geyer, 1989: 79; Lutz,
2002b: 723). Lutz argues that the United States has undergone a steady process
of militarization since the end of the Second World War and that the symbiotic
coupling of Fayetteville-Fort Bragg in popular discourse represents a microcosm of
this process. She thus places 9/11 and the American invasion of Afghanistan that
followed within the context of this history of US militarization rather than seeing a
historical break (Lutz, 2002b).
Lesley Gill (2004) discusses the ‘export’ of US militarization through the School
of the Americas (SOA). Seeking political, military, and cultural domination, she
writes, the US government has established a constellation of military bases world-
wide, an enormous defense budget, a massive stockpile of nuclear weapons, and a
system of ongoing alliances with repressive regimes. Other studies discuss processes
of militarization or anti-militarization (Ben-Ari and Fru¨hstu¨ck, 2003; McCaﬀrey,
2002; Ochs, 2011; Weiss, 2012).
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If militarization draws attention to the direct connection between military for-
mations and procedures and aspects of civilian life, militarism refers to a broader
concept that presents processes of militarization as ‘natural.’ Carol Cohn (1990),
for example, explains how defense experts naturalize violence in their discourse
about nuclear bombs by calling weapons with less fallout ‘clean bombs.’ Hugh
Gusterson (1996: 123) argues that scientists naturalize violence and security
through ‘nuclear rites,’ using ritual and metaphor to dehumanize potential victims
while humanizing the weapons they themselves design.
Militarism scholarship also explores the eﬀects of military culture on public
consciousness. Gusterson (2007) contends that this should be the principal lens
of study and that the anthropologist’s task is to reveal processes that give it
power. Militarism, he claims, should be both a concept and an object of study,
and he argues that anthropologists should examine both cases of militarism and its
sources. In this vein, Joseph Masco discusses the long-term consequences of the
Manhattan Project, explaining that the atomic bomb is ‘a national fetish, indeed
perhaps the national fetish of our time’ (2006: 17, emphasis in the original).
The bomb, Masco demonstrates, is not just the engine of American technoscientiﬁc
modernity; it has produced a new cognitive orientation toward everyday life, pro-
voking cross-cultural experiences of what he calls a ‘nuclear uncanny.’
The concept of militarism, which was developed to explain particular societies’
attitudes and acts of imperialism and exploitation, became a prism for studying
security formations, a diagnosis built into the design of the research itself, and an
explanatory theory (Ben-Ari, 2004; Gusterson, 2007). An associated anthropo-
logical ethos emerged around challenging these forms of power by identifying
militarist processes. Militarism thus functions at once as an object, a concept,
and a theoretical approach – these aspects are melded into one all-inclusive
research framework.
The shift to studies in which military and security formations are objects of
study, as we present above, reﬂects an ethical concern. If in studies of insecurity
and violence the anthropological ethos is one of witnessing and documenting,
militarism presents anthropologists with the dilemma of deﬁning the kind of the
relationship they should develop vis-a`-vis the military systems they investigate.
Scholars have distinguished between ‘critical anthropology of the military’ and
‘military anthropology’ as diﬀerent responses (Gusterson, 2007). Kerry Fosher,
whose work has frequently been categorized as the latter, discusses this dilemma
in her work on local security actors:
I wanted to provide some insights on U.S. homeland security from the perspective of
an insider/outsider, an anthropologist who set out to study, but has ended up working
with, one of the communities involved in creating security and emergency prepared-
ness. (2009: xiv–xv)
The military, which is, on the one hand, a signiﬁcant exemplar of the institutions
of power that anthropology has argued should be studied (i.e. ‘studying up’),
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on the other hand has become problematic as a ﬁeld of participant-observation.
An ethos of condemnation or denunciation gains traction as anthropology is once
again used to provide reports on ‘savages’ cultures’ subject to military violence
(Price, 2002, 2012).
This situation is exempliﬁed in discussions of the Pentagon’s Human Terrain
System project in Iraq and Afghanistan,5 a military program that hired social scien-
tists as counterinsurgency consultants. Its backers contended that ‘speaking truth
to power should mean something more than sniping from the ivory tower – rather,
it should mean constructive engagement with the national security community in a
spirit of open-minded discourse’ (McFate, 2007: 21). But critics of the project argue
that this program was but one episode in a long history of government attempts
to weaponize culture and anthropology (Gonza´lez, 2007; Price, 2006, 2011).
They emphasize that with the Human Terrain System project, the subsequent
Global Cultural Knowledge Network, and related algorithmic programs that
incorporate sociocultural information, military and intelligence agencies employ
social science to target the very subjects of research, using anthropology as one
more weapon on the battleﬁeld (Gonza´lez, 2015a, 2015b).
In sum, although the object has shifted to one of military actors and institutions,
and new concepts developed (e.g. militarism), the analytical limit is that the object
(militarism) has become a theory and the ultimate form of security action.
The anthropological ethos is divided between either accepting or denouncing the
objects of study themselves.
Para-state securitization
A third signiﬁcant theoretical cluster in the anthropology of security is a group of
studies that may appear to constitute a less coherent ﬁeld than violence and inse-
curity or military and militarism; we view them, however, as sharing a common
perspective on security. They posit that global processes of democratization,
de-statization, and neoliberalism reduce the state’s ability to provide security for
the population). The objects of study are security formations (rather than violence
or militarism) with which a distinctive form of action is identiﬁed, one that
increases insecurity because of changes that stem from global processes and the
decline of the state. In this group of studies, scholars have developed new concepts,
such as neoliberal security, corporate security, and (critical) human security, which
we collectively term ‘para-state security.’
In this work, democratization, globalization, and neoliberalism are consistently
seen as forces that contribute to rising insecurity, although they are processes that
are taking place at diﬀerent rates in diﬀerent regions in the world. James Holston
and Arjun Appadurai (1999) write that as nations democratize, the use of private
or market forms of security grows, while simultaneously extra-legal or illegal enti-
ties, such as death squads, expand to control the ‘marginal.’ Thus, democratization
brings about its own forms of para-state direct violence. Drawing on stories of
crime in El Salvador, Ellen Moodie (2010) reveals how, following that country’s
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long civil war, new violence and insecurity have emerged in the context of the
transition to neoliberalism and democracy. Violent acts are discursively reframed
as ‘common crime,’ she notes, and risk and inequality are rendered as driven by
common criminality rather than by political, state-organized ideology.
Globalization too may lead to violence. In his Fear of Small Numbers,
Appadurai (2006) explains how diverse types of violence that emerge within the
process of globalization, including ideocide (ideological supremacy or reductionism
that leads to enmity), underlie terrorism. Because globalization is tied in so many
ways to the spread of capitalism based on exploitation and inequality, it expands
the geography of violence and anger as it polarizes rich and poor worldwide.
In this vein, scholars have also studied the ideology of neoliberalism as a driver
of insecurity. As Daniel Goldstein explains, ‘security, rather than simply a reac-
tion to a terrorist attack that ‘‘changed everything,’’ is in fact characteristic of a
neoliberalism that predates the events of 9/11’ (2010: 487). The post 9/11 secur-
ity regime is thus presented as a ramiﬁcation of neoliberalism. By combining
‘techniques of governmentality’ with the ‘neoliberal mode,’ the state ‘frees itself
from the various responsibilities of maintaining its subjects, conferring on these
subjects themselves the daily obligations of self-maintenance and self-regulation’
(Goldstein, 2010: 491). As a result, local, private security groups proliferate and
replace state security.
Many of these studies describe how security formations change and work at the
local level, also showing that the proliferation of private security entities does not
result in more security or safety (Caldeira, 2000; Hansen, 2006; Low, 2003, 2011,
2013; Thomas et al., 2011; Welker, 2009). Setha Low’s (2003) research on gated
communities in the United States, for example, substantiates residents’ claims that
they are symbolically and materially trapped in an economic system that generates
much of their anxiety and insecurity. Kedron Thomas et al. discuss ‘neoliberal
security’ in Guatemala as ‘a new set of practices and strategies that privatize
what would otherwise be the state’s responsibility to secure the city’ (2011: 2).
They document ethnographically what people do and the new security/insecurity
formations that emerge in the context of ‘the country’s new violence’ (2011: 2).
Critical studies have also emerged in response to human security conditions
after/beyond the state. This literature ‘argues that there is an ethical responsibility
to re-orient security around the individual in line with internationally recognized
standards of human rights and governance’ and ‘to encourage security providers –
and speciﬁcally the state – to invest the attention and resources necessary to address
these non-traditional security challenges’ (Newman, 2010: 78–81). Critical human
security refuses a strict correspondence between security and the state and the
military, or the equation of security with the provision of physical safety (Shani
et al., 2007). This critique has emerged in international relations (e.g. Evans, 2010;
Newman, 2010; Owen, 2004) as well as in anthropology, in two main subﬁelds:
human security (striving for and resistance to) (e.g. Eriksen et al., 2010) and
humanitarian intervention (e.g. Beckett, 2013; Fassin and Pandolﬁ, 2010). Both
groups of studies move beyond the moral critique of security and human security,
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toward understanding them as new political formations, and in some cases to
discussion of possible forms of resistance.6
Broadly speaking, the object here has shifted from state-directed forms of vio-
lence to para-state forms, from military and national security entities to a prolif-
eration of private, local security formations and new global security forms such as
humanitarianism. Previously subjected to state power and terror, populations are
now often subjected to non-state forms of security, and therein bear witness to
violence and insecurity. Analytic concepts have been developed to introduce these
new security formations, including corporate security (Welker, 2009), human secur-
ity (Eriksen et al., 2010), neoliberal security (Goldstein, 2010; Lippert and Walby,
2013; Thomas et al., 2011), and securitization (Low, 2011).7 The anthropological
ethos of this approach is not denunciation, as was the case in the study of militar-
ism; rather, it is theoretical and analytical (cf. Fassin). The analytical limit, how-
ever, lies in the fact that while the objects are diverse (many forms of para-state
security), these new forms of security are still reduced to insecurity.
Security assemblages
We have shown that each previous group of studies can be understood as involving
a diﬀerent form of security, which together provide a genealogy for the anthropol-
ogy of security. Each has a diﬀerent object of research, analyzes related forms and
practices of security, and has a critical analytical limitation. The approach we
propose here takes up security as an assemblage of forms of governance and
power. We focus on security forms of action and whether these are part of the
nation-state formation or not, ask how they work.
In developing security assemblages as a conceptual approach to anthropological
theory and inquiry, we draw on Michel Foucault’s concepts of governmentality
and the security apparatus, and on the methodology and ethical stance from which
they were produced. Foucault, writing on governmentality (2007 [2004]), presented
three forms of governance – sovereignty, discipline, and a biopolitical security
apparatus – thus highlighting the heterogeneity of power. Each form emerged his-
torically in response to a speciﬁc governmental problem, and each was enacted with
a certain aim and through certain practices. However, these technologies are not
mutually exclusive, and the emergence of one does not imply the disappearance of
another. The biopolitical security apparatus refers speciﬁcally to a technology of
governing the population through the rationale of normalization (of circulation
and freedom).
While the security apparatus is one speciﬁc form of governing, methodologically
it suggests that security’s forms of action are not only distinguishable by way of the
entity that enacts them (i.e. an institution) but can also be conceptualized distinct-
ively (in terms of their action). In other words, types of security are understood and
assessed as particular forms of governance and power, thus shifting the focus from
their eﬀectiveness to their forms of action (e.g. prevention, resilience, prepared-
ness). In this mode of attention, the anthropologist ﬁrst attends to emerging forms
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of security analytically, rather than morally or in terms of a predetermined theory.
This approach underscores the diversity of security forms of action: the particular
ways that security works in relation to its subjects, whether individuals or populations.
The question we pose next is how they emerge within particular empirical situations,
and what types of objects, concepts, and anthropological ethos are produced.
The broad literature presents conceptually distinct formations of security in rich
perspective, although even in recent work the main form of action continues to be
one of increasing militarization and securitization, on the one hand, and insecurity,
on the other hand. Masco, for example, describes how the post-Cold War security
state emerges as a ‘militarized counterformation’ to threat, in which climate, ﬁnance,
domestic infrastructure, and health ‘fail to rise to the level of a national security
problem despite the widespread destruction and terrors that they produce,’ except to
the extent that they are militarizable (2014: 41). He argues that failures in the coun-
terterrorism state become justiﬁcations for the expansion of the very mechanisms of
governance that allowed the breakdowns, enabling ‘forms of everyday violence that
increase the day-to-day insecurity of American society in vital and immediate ways’
(2014: 200). Writing on biosecurity, Carlo Caduﬀ echoes Masco’s observation that
security ‘has itself become a signiﬁcant source of insecurity’ (2014: 115) and suggests
moving to the problematization of insecurity. He argues that the emergence of secur-
ity ‘solutions’ does not ‘solve’ the problem of security discursively or in practice.
This work shows that despite the proliferation of security formations, some
forms of insecurity are increasing. We argue, however, that taking up security as
insecurity, and more generally as a totalizing process, does not allow us to capture
security and its eﬀects in the world. In the cases that follow, the question of what
forms security and insecurity take today is refashioned to include inquiry into
diverse security forms of action (how they emerge and function). This reorientation
can productively challenge basic, taken-for-granted theories of security, from those
tied to the nation-state to others that attend only to the reproduction of violence.
Rather than subordinating security to an all-encompassing theory, objects, con-
cepts, and rationalities related to diﬀerent security forms of action as well as the
ethical mode of the anthropologist are assembled.
Anticipation, prevention, and resilience: Three forms
of security action in US counterterrorism
In this section, we present ethnographic cases of counterterrorism to illustrate how,
as an anthropological approach, security analytics lends itself to identifying diverse
conceptualizations of ‘the terrorist threat’ and responses to it in the domains of
policing, biomedical research, and counter-extremism.
Anticipation and law enforcement
In September 2001, few police oﬃcers thought much about terrorism. They dealt
with crime, and, legally, there was little overlap. During the ﬁrst part of the
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20th century, police intelligence units had targeted anarchists, socialists, and other
labor agitators, imputing to them diverse acts of violence (Donner, 1990). Later,
police inﬁltrated the Civil Rights movement and anti-Vietnam War activists,
encouraged by federal agencies and serving their purposes (Waxman, 2011: 298–
301). Following revelations about this abusive surveillance, however (Church and
Tower, 1976), these units were pared down, dissolved, or shifted to strictly criminal
intelligence. Moreover, their surveillance operations had little to do with ‘counter-
terrorism’ until an expansive shift in the concept of terrorism took place, absorbing
what had formerly been bombings, kidnappings and assassinations (Zulaika, 2009:
17–18). A former oﬃcer whom Stalcup interviewed in 2008, when he was the dir-
ector of a major urban area intelligence fusion center, reﬂected on this pre-9/11
worldview:
I guess we never felt like we were engaged in the world of international terrorism. You
know, that was something the intelligence community handled, and the FBI; and
maybe something Customs handled a little bit and Border Patrol, in protecting our
borders; and the Department of Defense handled – nothing we handled.
But in the days after 9/11, the sense of distance felt by state and local police shrank
as it became suddenly clear that the terrorists had been living among them.
Local newspapers ran stories about how the men had behaved at bars, motels,
and gyms (Burdi et al., 2011). And the police had stopped several of them for minor
traﬃc violations. ‘It is always a local cop who saw something,’ said a former vice
oﬃcer, by then the deputy director of a fusion center, in an interview in 2006, and
this insight was central to the resurgence of police involvement in national intelli-
gence, through what would be called the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting
(SAR) Initiative (NSI) (Stalcup, 2015b).
Almost immediately after the events of 9/11, the police themselves and analysts
throughout government observed that the sheer number of oﬃcers in everyday
contact with the public (around 800,000 sworn personnel, the equivalent of
nearly 20 percent of the entire federal workforce) made them a valuable counter-
terrorism resource. When the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP)
held a summit in the spring of 2002, they commented on ‘the unique potential for
community oriented policing initiatives to aid in the gathering of locally driven
intelligence’ (IACP, 2002: i). The SAR initiative would eventually be housed in the
Information Sharing Environment (ISE.gov), established by the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004; in 2009, drawing on these years of
preliminary work, a pilot project was rolled out in multiple cities (US DOJ, 2010).
The pilot tested the initiative’s central idea, that of standardizing what police
oﬃcers routinely do to recognize and report suspicious behaviors as a way of
addressing the perceived surveillance lacuna of 9/11. When oﬃcers meet someone
in the ﬁeld and something seems not to ‘belong,’ they have the option of writing up
a Field Incident or Field Encounter card. This documentation creates a paper trail
that, in the event of a future crime, could help build a case. Drawing on a list
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developed by the Los Angeles Police Department, the SAR initiative developed a
set of 16 behavioral categories to guide these observations (of an oﬃcer, or a write-
up, if reported by a civilian) and to code submissions for review. The behaviors
themselves ranged from the illegal (e.g. breach, theft, sabotage) to suspect only in
context (e.g. testing or probing of security, observation/surveillance, materials
acquisition, and, most controversially, photography). Larger law enforcement
agencies might have a dedicated unit for assessing the nexus to potential terrorism
in such a report; most lack this capacity, and would submit the write-up to a city or
regional intelligence fusion center, or to the FBI.
At this next step, the incident would again be evaluated for ties to terrorism.
Oﬃcially, intelligence analysts must review ‘the newly reported SAR informa-
tion against [the] 16 pre-operational behaviors associated with terrorism,’
(ISE, 2015: 14). The lead analyst at the fusion center in 2012 explained, however,
that he did not want or use a checklist, saying that he needed to assess the ensemble
of incidents in a period of time: ‘Let’s say I look through one week’s submitted
reports – that [collection of reports] will tell me something, not the checklist.
That will give me a sense of what is going on.’ An incident that has been vetted
and deemed ‘reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning associated with
terrorism’ becomes an oﬃcial ISE-SAR (ISE, 2015: 9), and is shared up the federal
hierarchy (via compatible communication protocols) and also horizontally between
states and regions.
The routine task of observing public behaviors is thus fully systematized into
steps for gathering, evaluating, and sharing information in a process that seeks to
anticipate events. The goal is to identify a plot in motion, without needing to know
or imagine the plot itself. By targeting generic pre-event behaviors, understood as
intermediate steps leading to an event, the NSI aims to create a process that can
discern the signs of a new kind of threat or attack (unknowable in advance), as well
as common acts of violence, already too familiar.
This anticipatory approach is one form of action, which can be distinguished
from that of other security eﬀorts to deter terrorist acts or mitigate their conse-
quences, for example. To anticipate, here, is to act as a forerunner or precursor,
capturing the suspicious activities understood to come before and anticipate ter-
rorism. Through this mechanism, the NSI addresses one of the central problematics
of security, the need to ‘foresee, identify, and act upon threats in time’
(Dunn Cavelty et al., 2015: 5). SARs link the present with the future, as oﬃcer
and analyst together create a record of behaviors that may be ‘precursors to ter-
rorism,’ amplifying inconspicuous components of the period when an attack could
come into existence. This intermediary role of suspicious activity reporting enables
it to feed technologies of both prevention and resilience.
Prevention and biomedical research8
In 2004, the Committee on Research Standards and Practices to Prevent the
Destructive Application for Biotechnology issued the Biotechnology Research in
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the Age of Terrorism Report (aka the Fink Report), which surveyed biotechno-
logical research options in light of terrorist threats and formulated recommenda-
tions for extra precautions in the life sciences (US Department of Health and
Human Services [HHS], 2004). The Fink Report deﬁned the problem of biosecurity
as a dual use (DU) issue and recommended the establishment of the NSABB to
‘advise all Federal departments and agencies that conduct or support life sciences
research that could fall into the ‘Dual Use’ category’ (HHS, 2004).
In March 2006, the NSABB coined the term ‘Dual Use Research of Concern’
(DURC) to replace ‘dual use’ (DU). The new term reﬂected the idea that since
‘most if not all Life Sciences research could be considered Dual Use,’ it was import-
ant ‘to identify speciﬁc Life Sciences research that could be of greatest concern for
misuse’ (NSABB, 2006; emphasis in the original). Whereas DU refers to preventing
leaks of material and information from laboratories, DURC suggests that certain
kinds of research, under certain circumstances, are inherently ‘of concern.’
It reﬂects a shift from the idea of external danger to possible internal risk that
must be assessed to be prevented. Prevention, as Franc¸ois Ewald explains, ‘presup-
poses science, technical control, the idea of possible understanding, and objective
measurement of risks. Thus the problem is no longer that of compensating for
practically inescapable losses but of reducing the probability of their occurrence’
(2002: 281–2). As evidenced by a controversy that would erupt ﬁve years later,
neither the NSABB nor the biomedical research establishment could reach a con-
sensus on what constituted a clear case of DURC and on how to assess the risk
entailed by such research, in order to prevent it.
In September 2011, Ron Fouchier, a virologist at Erasmus University in
Rotterdam, the Netherlands, revealed that his research team had transformed
the H5N1 avian inﬂuenza virus into an aerosol that was transmissible among
human beings. At the same time, researchers at the University of Wisconsin-
Madison in the United States, led by virologist Yoshihiro Kawaoka, reported
similar results (Enserink, 2011; MacKenzie, 2011). Concerns regarding the impli-
cations of these results were raised as the research neared publication in the jour-
nals Nature and Science (Enserink, 2012; Enserink and Malakoﬀ, 2012).
The journals’ editors were asked to seek the NSABB’s advice and receive approval
to publish the studies.
Once the articles arrived at the NSABB for review, the question was
whether preventing their publication would eliminate the threat. Above all, the
idea that risk could be attributed only to actors outside the scientiﬁc world
began to crumble. Scientists had themselves created a new threat, one that was
inherently embedded in the research design and not only in the aftermath of its
completion.
The fact that such potentially harmful studies had been conducted without
external oversight and had been halted only at publication led to public outcry
in the United States and raised questions regarding the ethics and social obligations
of scientiﬁc researchers, as well as major objections to publication of the studies.
Thomas Ingelsby of the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh in
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Pennsylvania objected to the publication in these terms:
The beneﬁts of publishing this work do not outweigh the dangers of showing others
how to replicate it. . . . Someone might try to make it into a weapon . . . but a more
likely threat is that more scientists will work with the modiﬁed virus, increasing the
likelihood of it escaping the lab. Small mistakes in biosafety could have terrible global
consequences. (MacKenzie, 2011)
A public debate regarding scientiﬁc responsibility for producing such threats erupted,
with the scientiﬁc community torn between the two sides. The idea of weighing risks
versus beneﬁts, or calculating a risk/beneﬁt ratio, for DURC experiments began to
develop (Osterholm and Henderson, 2012). The New York Times, for example, saw
little beneﬁt and expressed this view in an editorial titled ‘An Engineered Doomsday’:
Defenders of the research in Rotterdam . . . say the ﬁndings could prove helpful in
monitoring virus samples from infected birds and animals. . . . But it is highly uncer-
tain, even improbable, that the virus would mutate in nature along the pathways
prodded in a laboratory environment, so [any such] beneﬁt . . . seems marginal.
(New York Times, 2012)
Research proponents meanwhile argued that public health could be harmed if the
virus were not studied.
At the height of the discussion, in December 2011, the NSABB issued its rec-
ommendations following its review of the articles and suggested publishing them
without a methodology section:
Due to the importance of the ﬁndings to the public health and research communities, the
NSABB recommends that the general conclusions highlighting the novel outcome be pub-
lished, but that the manuscripts not include the methodological and other details that could
enable replication of the experiments by those who would seek to do harm. (NIH, 2011)
Additionally, the NSABB recommended that full details be provided to a desig-
nated group of scientists ‘authorized’ to use the information to conduct ‘respon-
sible’ research on the topic.
The decision was controversial, and the NSABB was pressured to change it.
In February 2012, the American Society of Microbiology (ASM) hosted a meeting
on ‘Biodefense and Emerging Diseases’ at which one session was devoted to the
H5N1 work. Anthony Fauci (of the NIH) announced that he had asked the two
researchers to revise their papers for NSABB review. That same month, a gathering
of NSABB members and more than a dozen observers, including NIH director
Francis Collins and WHO member Keiji Fukuda, took place at the NIH campus.
The participants read the original and revised reports and voted to allow full
publication of the revised studies (NSABB 2012), both of which were published
in 2012 (Herfst et al., 2012; Imai et al., 2012).
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Following the H5N1 controversy, the US government issued a number of poli-
cies, including one in March 2012, concerning the oversight of DURC (US
Government, 2012). The goal was to establish regular review of possible DURC
that was funded or conducted by the government, minimizing the risk of such work
while preserving its beneﬁts. In May 2015, the NSABB issued its recommendations
for a framework to conduct risk-beneﬁt assessments of gain-of-function research.
This framework was predicated on the idea that speciﬁc risk-beneﬁt calculations
relating to potentially harmful research could be devised, and it addressed the
issues of how to evaluate and whether to fund such research, in order to prevent
a future bioterrorism event. To summarize, in Brian Massumi’s words:
‘Epistemologically, prevention assumes an ability to assess threats empirically
and identify their causes. Once the causes are identiﬁed, appropriate curative meth-
ods are sought to avoid their realization’ (2015: 5).
Resilience and federal-local counter-extremism
In 2011, the White House launched a new national strategy to tackle concerns
about domestic terrorism, titled Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent
Extremism in the United States. The events perpetrated by 19 hijackers on 9/11
were a decade past, and new ﬁgures of suspicion had begun to emerge: individuals
or groups of friends who were being ‘radicalized to support or commit acts of
ideologically-inspired violence’ (White House, 2011b: 2). The White House strat-
egy, labeled ‘Countering Violent Extremism’ (CVE), might eventually collect coun-
terterrorism intelligence but was nonetheless an altogether diﬀerent initiative that
developed a distinctive form of action.
Fre´de´ric Gros, building on analysis by Foucault, contrasts the ‘enemy of the
state,’ which threatens sovereign security, with the ‘suspect’ of biopolitical security,
a paradigmatic ﬁgure which emerges from the generalized distrust that accompa-
nies the global ﬂows and circulation of contemporary life:
The enemy comes from the exterior and by the very fact of his threat patches up the
holes in the national community. The enemy is identiﬁable and deﬁnable. . . . The
suspect, however, is by deﬁnition non-locatable and unpredictable. He is here, close
at hand, and his threatening presence turns me into a stranger even to my closest
neighbors. (2014: 27)
After a series of fatal shootings in the US, perhaps most inﬂuentially by an Army
psychiatrist at the Fort Hood military base in 2009, what was clear was that (as in
the domain of biosecurity) risk could no longer be attributed only to outside actors,
nor suspicion limited to them.
The updated National Strategy for Counterterror issued in 2011 reiterated that
the country’s counterterrorism focus was ‘war with a speciﬁc organization –
al-Qa‘ida’ as well as its ‘aﬃliates and adherents’ (2011a: 1). CVE, in contrast,
identiﬁed both a diﬀerent problem and approach. Rather than targeting those
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vulnerable to radicalization directly (as the FBI routinely did [Kumar, 2010]), the
strategy moved upstream, arguing that American communities were ‘targeted by
violent extremists,’ and the solution was to build their resilience against the threat
of radicalization.
Resilience has various meanings, but particularly since 9/11, researchers have
noted the rise of its ‘security-driven’ sense, in which security practices are repack-
aged in more palatable expressions of resilience and ‘resilience policy becomes
increasingly mobilized by security concerns’ (Coaﬀee and Fussey, 2015: 91).
Embedded in this usage is the assumption that ‘the (in)security of a subject depends
not only on the character and severity of the threat it is exposed to (its vulnerabil-
ity), but also on the subject itself – namely, its resilience to detrimental events’
(Dunn Cavelty et al., 2015: 4). The subject of key parts of the CVE eﬀort was the
community itself, and it was to be made capable of and responsible for identifying
radicalization (and thereby countering violent extremism).9
When the strategy was launched, CVE community engagement was already
under way at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (White House,
2011c). The DHS staﬀ of the Oﬃce of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL)
regularly ﬂew out from Washington, DC, to participate in ‘roundtables,’ hosted by
local contacts, often law enforcement. The oﬃcial aim of the roundtables, which
were held quarterly in 15 or so cities (the number was expected to gradually
increase), was to bring together members of the ‘diverse American communities
whose civil rights may be aﬀected by Department activities’ (DHS, 2016).10
The meetings usually attracted a mix of Muslim organizations; those often mis-
taken as Muslim, such as Sikhs; and advocates for diverse constituents included
under the ‘homeland security’ umbrella, particularly immigrants: local legal ser-
vices, NGOs, and representatives for politicians. For all the local attendees, the
meetings were conduits for information on DHS policy, and they oﬀered one of the
few venues to press back.
At a roundtable on the outskirts of Seattle in 2013, for example, a man got up to
explain the treatment he had received at the hands of Transportation Security
Administration oﬃcials (an agency within DHS), and to question why and how
he was routinely singled out. ‘They are checking the turbans at the airport,’ he said,
pointing at his own head. ‘They must have a device [to scan the turban], but we are
asked to remove it.’ Transportation security oﬃcers had also laughed at him during
the screening, and, in the end, he had missed his ﬂight. As he sat down, a man from
an activist organization stood. ‘There have been several reports,’ he said, of ‘people
being threatened with loss of citizenship or denial of pending applications if they
refuse to speak with the FBI without an attorney.’ The crowd was attentive. ‘Who
do we report this to within USCIS [United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services]?’
Other community engagement techniques from DHS include cultural compe-
tency training for law enforcement, Community Awareness Brieﬁngs (these were
updated as concerns increased about youths traveling to join foreign conﬂicts,
particularly in Iraq and Syria), an Incident Community Coordination Team for
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rapid two-way communication between the federal government and impacted com-
munities in the event of a homeland security incident, and an adaptable
Community Resilience Exercise (CREX). Resilience practices such as these, note
Jon Coaﬀee and Pete Fussey, ‘are seen as simultaneously proactive and reactive,
with built-in adaptability to the ﬂuid nature of myriad threats and hazards challen-
ging states and their territories’ (2015: 88). In their review of the development
and evolution of the concept of resilience in many diﬀerent domains, Myriam
Dunn Cavelty et al. argue that resilience simultaneously demands a response to
past events (‘threats that have materialized as disasters or shocks’), and a reaction
that ‘adheres in the future,’ since resilience is ‘that which can be done if future
threats cannot be averted in time’ (2015: 9). In the case of CVE, past and future,
threat and solution, cohere in the same suspicious and vulnerable subjects and
communities.
If the NSABB aimed to prevent biosecurity disasters by identifying causes and
addressing them (not funding research that was too risky for too little beneﬁt, for
example), the CVE strategy works instead for community engagement techniques
to keep the ‘cause’ (radicalization) from taking root in the ﬁrst place. If Suspicious
Activity Reporting tries to preclude terrorist events through telltale behaviors that
anticipate potential events, Countering Violent Extremism works even further
upstream, a move necessitated by the new understanding of the threat as the
potential radicalization of communities and their members, who, however
singled-out, are nonetheless deﬁnitively located within the United States.
Discussion
While signiﬁcant ‘anthropologies of’ in their own right, the bodies of scholarship
that we characterized in the ﬁrst part of this article can also be understood as
integral to the way that anthropology has approached security more broadly.
Each has an object of research, analyzes forms and practices of security (with
respect to their production of violence or insecurity), involves a particular
anthropological ethos, and has a critical analytical limitation. Security becomes,
in these clusters, a formation with more or less power, violence, or insecurity.
Security assemblages, as we present in our ethnographic cases, is a theoretical
approach in the sense that it oﬀers general (although not universal) tools for
diﬀerentiating and describing the inevitably particular relations between diﬀerent
aspects of empirical situations. In their very incompatibility with all-encompassing
theory, these tools produce a set of orientations to the anthropology of security.
This is an approach which, ﬁrst, treats security as part of an assemblage of gov-
ernmental mechanisms that is neither opposed to the state nor solely identiﬁed with
it. In line with post-Foucauldian scholarship that elaborates multiple forms of
governance (Anderson, 2010; Collier and Lakoﬀ, 2008; Lentzos and Rose, 2009),
we are interested in diverse actors and forms of security action. Second, security as
a governmental form does not necessarily stand in contrast to ‘rights’ or freedom.
For Foucault, security apparatuses are biopolitical forms of enabled movement
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and circulation under a particular regulatory structure, distinct from other mech-
anisms of governing. Likewise, security assemblages acknowledge and oﬀer tools
for delimiting the intimate relationships between freedom and power in diverse
forms of security (as Filippa Lentzos and Nikolas Rose [2009] suggest), rather
than totalizing observations of violence or insecurity framed as immanently redu-
cing freedom. Third, the ethical mode of anthropological analysis suggested in this
approach is not documenting or witnessing the ‘ﬁeld’ of study, nor is it positioned
as an external critique and denunciation of these security forms and the growth of
insecurity. Instead, we move from ﬁrst-order observation of what is ‘really’ hap-
pening (and possible solutions), ontologically, to the extraction of new forms of
security action and the development of new concepts. Doing so requires shaking
loose presuppositions and fostering breaks (second-order observation; see
Luhmann, 1998; Rabinow, 2008).
Critique here is not an act of pointing to moral or analytical blind spots, although
it can lead to and support these ends and forms of resistance. Instead, in approaching
security through assemblages, anthropological critique takes the form of a demand
for an ethical mode of adjacency (Rabinow, 2008), which derives not from being
more or less embedded in the ﬁeld but from awareness of the critical limitations every
approach inherently has. Ethically, what one can do is become aware of limitations
(such as how a theory may impose an overdetermined holism), able to recognize
when one is wrong, and remain open to change in oneself and in one’s ideas (see also
Samimian-Darash and Rabinow, 2015). This is to say, security, insecurity, and vio-
lence are all ontological forms available to anthropological inquiry, and extracting a
particular concept for analysis from any one of them will depend on an ethical
stance. The object-concept-subject deﬁnitions and theories of violence, insecurity,
and security cannot be detached from the preliminary ethical position.
In sum, in presenting security assemblages we observe that it is possible and
important to take security as an anthropological object and thus separate it from
insecurity and violence. We can attend to more than new formations of security (of
the military, the state or other entities) by recognizing their diverse forms of action.
The selective yet inﬂationary mode of security, which ultimately produces more
insecurity, is one signiﬁcant form of action, but there are many others in the anthro-
pology of security with aﬀects and eﬀects that are not so neatly categorized. Our
anthropological ethos is second-order and critical: we do not try to solve the problem
proposed by the system under study but rather question its premises, practices, and
repercussions. By working with concepts that allow us to characterize forms of
action, we have access to other levels of observation beyond the one immediately
captured, including the ever-changing ways of producing security and insecurity.
Notes
1. The fieldwork discussed in this article was carried out between 2006 and 2014 by
the authors, in independent research projects that we frequently discussed with one
another. The work on counterterrorism in the domains of law enforcement and homeland
security was undertaken by Stalcup while the biomedical research was undertaken
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by Samimian-Darash. Public figures are named; pseudonyms are used for all other
informants. Both authors contributed equally to this work.
2. Deleuze and Guattari elaborate ‘assemblages’ as complex structures of elements that
communicate not hierarchically or through linear connections, but rather as a rhizome
(in contrast to trees). They write (1987: 12): ‘All of tree logic is a logic of tracing and
reproduction [. . .] The rhizome is altogether different, a map and not a tracing.’ Tracing
describes something that was already there, while: ‘What distinguishes the map from the
tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward experimentation in contact with the real.’
The tracing always comes back ‘to the same,’ but a map has multiple entryways.
Significantly, they can be understood as separating two logics of communication, that
of the tree structure and the rhizome. While the logic of the tree, like the state, is that of a
central power from which twigs branch out, the rhizome grows as a multiplicity, not
subject to a single center. The emphasis, for Deleuze and Guattari, is on the connections
between the infinite number of roots, and the fact that the rhizome form is in perpetual
motion, and, therefore not given in advance; the units composing a rhizome are them-
selves changing. This concept of the assemblage is important, especially in how it differs
from that of an apparatus. As Rabinow puts it: ‘The apparatus is a specific response to a
historical problem. It is however a dominating strategic response’ (2003: 54). An assem-
blage, in contrast, is heterogeneous, dynamic, and does not represent a major response.
Rather, it can be characterized by numerous sub-structures that exist simultaneously (see
also Samimian-Darash, 2009).
3. Explanations for each category are as follow. Objects are the objects of research, and
here, the specific security objects in the different sets of studies. Concepts are the main
concepts scholars have developed to present their approach to security and to the security
objects they identify. A security form of action refers to, for main governing formations,
how security works, and is presented as acting in that group of studies. There may be
multiple or singular forms of action. Critique refers to the critique of security that
scholars present in their work. Anthropological ethos is the ethical stand the anthropolo-
gist takes in conducting inquiry. Analytical limit draws on Rabinow and Bennett’s con-
cept of the critical limitation as a structural incapacity introduced by unacknowledged
externalities (2012: 52). That is, if externalities refer to what is excluded by a particular
mode of thought (in economics, factors not taken into account in establishing the market
prices), then critical limitations refer to that which cannot be thought through this mode.
Likewise, we argue that all anthropological approaches have an analytical limit.
4. In this regard, Veena Das (1995) talks about the ‘missing self’ in the study of violence in
anthropology, and she uses the term victim to go beyond the distinction between indi-
vidual and community. The concept of the victim also explains private pain as socially
constructed and enables inquiry into how the state uses suffering to establish itself.
5. This discussion has been carried out over several publications (e.g. Gonza´lez, 2007, 2010,
2015a, 2015b; McFate, 2005, 2007; McFate and Jackson, 2005; Price, 2002, 2006, 2011;
Sluka, 2010).
6. In this regard, Eriksen et al. argue that the anthropology of human security has moved
‘beyond both the nostalgia implicit in some of the globalisation literature, as well as the
old-style cultural relativism which tacitly assumes that wholly traditional lives are prefer-
able to partly modernised ones.. . . Security-building activities are confronted with risks,
some of them transnational; with insecurities associated with war, environmental problems,
crime, etc.; and also with individualization and ideological tendencies favouring individual
freedom at the expense of sacrificing security’ (2010: 5).
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7. The term securitization was famously coined by Ole Wæver (1995) of the Copenhagen
School to refer to security as practice rather than idea. Instead of presenting security as a
reality prior to language, which is to say, a theoretical explanation marking events ‘in
the world,’ securitization refers to security as a speech act with pragmatic intent and
consequences. Setha Low explains how the term securitization is used to describe ‘inter-
locking and overlapping, special, legal, institutional, governmental, and financial stra-
tegies of producing security’ (2011: 389); it is specifically connected to recent neoliberal
policies and the growth of privatization, followed by the emergence of new forms of
(para-state) security.
8. See a comprehensive analysis of this case in Samimian-Darash (forthcoming) and
Samimian-Darash et al. (2016).
9. The Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) plan was three-fold in total: develop
government and law enforcement expertise, counter (online) violent extremist
propaganda, and build community resilience through a series of platforms (White
House, 2011c: 2).
10. They list these communities as: American Arab, Muslim, South Asian, Middle Eastern,
Somali, Sikh, Latino, Jewish, and Asian/Asian Pacific Islander (DHS, 2016).
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